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Teaching undergraduate econometrics: some sensible shifts to improve 




[Let’s not kid ourselves … there’s still “con” in Econometrics … but, it’s fixable with 
improved undergraduate instruction] 
 
Jeremy Arkes 







Undergraduate econometrics is generally taught as if everyone will become a Ph.D. economist, 
or even an econometric theorist.  In this article, I build off of Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) 
arguments for how the teaching of undergraduate econometrics could become more effective and 
efficient, and I propose a further redesign that would better serve the vast majority of students.  
The rationale for my redesign follows directly from several premises, most notably: (1) few 
students will become academics; (2) research is rife with errors, which suggests the conventional 
methods for teaching econometrics do not adequately prepare students to recognize biases; and 
(3) there is an ethical problem in searching for significance and other matters.  Based on these, I 
recommend large shifts in emphasis, new pedagogy, and adding important components (e.g., on 
interpretations and simple ethical lessons) that are largely ignored in current textbooks.  These 
include: (A) an increased focus on and new methods for teaching how to recognize biases; (B) 
increased emphasis on proper interpretations; (C) lessons on ethical considerations; and (D) a 







On January 23, 2015, basketball player Klay Thompson of the Golden State Warriors hit all 13 
of his shot attempts in the 3rd quarter of a game against the Sacramento Kings—this included 
making 10 of 10 on 3-point shots.1  These 3-point shots were not all wide-open 3-point shots 
players typically take (with the team passing the ball around until they find that open player).  
Rather, several of them were from far beyond the 3-point line or with a defender close enough to 
him that, under normal circumstances, no one would dare take such a heavily-contested shot. 
 
Everyone knew that Klay Thompson was “in the zone” or “en fuego,” or that Thompson had the 
“hot hand” that night.   Everyone that is … unless you’re a statistician, a psychologist, or an 
economist (particularly, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist) without adequate training in 
econometrics or regression analysis.  Starting with a paper by Gilovich et al. (1985), an entire 
literature over 25 years found no evidence for the hot hand in basketball.  Even the famous 
evolutionary biologist, Steve Jay Gould, got in on this research (Gould, 1989).  From these 
results, these researchers claimed that the hot hand was a “myth” or “cognitive illusion.”   
 
This was an incredibly appealing result: that all basketball players and fans were wrong to 
believe in the hot hand (players achieving a temporary higher playing level) and that they were 
committing the cognitive bias of seeing patterns (the hot hand) in data that, the researchers 
claimed, were actually random, and determined by a binomial process.  And so, the story has 
shown up in many popular books—e.g., Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and Thinking Fast 
and Slow (Kahneman, 2011).  Note that Kahneman and Thaler are the 2002 and 2017 Nobel-
Prize-in-Economics winners.2  And, this was a story that a recent-Harvard-President-and-almost-
Fed-Chairman-nominee gave to the Harvard men’s basketball team, as he brought media along in 
his address to the team (Brooks, 2015). 
 
But, it turns out, these researchers and writers failed to recognize a few biases.  And, they made a 
major logical error in their interpretation.  Both of these are discussed in a moment. 
 
From my experience playing basketball and occasionally having the hot hand, I knew the 
researchers were wrong to conclude that the hot hand was a myth. Eventually, I came up with a 
more powerful model by pooling all players together in a player-fixed-effects model rather than 
have players analyzed one at a time, as in the prior studies.  In Arkes (2010), I found the first 
evidence for the hot hand, showing that players were about 3 to 5-percentage points more likely 
to make a second of two free throws if they had made their first free throw.  
 
Yet, I failed to recognize an obvious bias in past studies and my own study that Stone (2012) 
noted: measurement error.  Whether a player made their first free throw is not a good indicator of 
whether the player was in the hot-hand state, and so the mis-classification would likely cause a 
downward bias in the estimated hot-hand effect.  There was another subtle bias in these studies 
from improper sampling, as noted by Miller and Sanjurjo (2018).  These biases make it more 
difficult to detect the hot hand. 
																																																								
1 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BNHjX_08FE0.  Note that one of the ten 3-pointers came after a referee 
2 The Nobel committee didn’t ask me for my input. 
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Reading Stone (2012) was a watershed moment for me.  I realized that I had learned equation-
wise how these biases work in econometrics, but I never truly learned how to recognize some of 
these biases.  And, this is a pattern I have seen among graduate students.  The conventional 
methods for teaching econometrics that I was exposed to did not teach me (nor the Nobel Prize 
winners or others) how to properly scrutinize a regression. 
 
What was also exposed in these studies and writings (beyond the failure to recognize the 
measurement error) was the authors’ incorrect interpretations.  They took the insignificant 
estimate to indicate proof that the hot hand does not exist.  That is akin to taking O.J. Simpson’s 
not-guilty verdict and claiming that it proves he was innocent.  The proper interpretation should 
have been that the researchers found no evidence for the hot hand. 
 
Angrist and Pischke (2017) recently called for a shift in how undergraduate econometrics should 
be taught.  Their main recommended shifts were: 
(1) The abstract equations and high-level math should be replaced with real examples; 
(2) The emphasis on efficiency (getting the standard errors correct) and functional form should 
be reduced; 
(3) There should be greater emphasis on choosing the best set of control variables for causal 
interpretation of some treatment variable; 
(4) There should be a shift towards randomized control trials and quasi-experimental methods 
(e.g., regression-discontinuities and difference-in-difference methods), as these are the methods 
most often used by economists these days. 
 
Angrist and Pischke’s recommendations, particularly (3) and (4), appear to be largely based on 
earlier arguments they made (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) that better data and better study designs 
have helped economists take the “con” out of econometrics.  They cite several random-
assignment studies, including studies on the effects of cash transfers on child welfare (e.g., 
Gertler, 2004) and on the effects of housing vouchers (Kling et al., 2007).  
 
However, I would argue, in light of the story arc on the hot-hand studies and other evidence of 
virtually entire literatures on some topics being subject to unrecognized biases, that there is still 
plenty of “con” remaining.  And, the major source of the problem appears to be the failure to 
properly recognize biases.  Secondary problems, in my view, are improper interpretations and 
ethical problems in research. 
 
In this article, I build off of Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) argument, offering support for some 
contentions, noting other problems in how undergraduate econometrics is conventionally taught, 
and offering further ways in which econometrics should be re-invented to better prepare 
researchers and consumers of research.  Most notably, I make the case for how there needs to be 
increased emphasis and new methods to teach students how to recognize biases. 
 
One major basis of my changes is that only a small percentage of undergraduate econometric 
students will go on to become academicians in which they can choose their own topic by 
searching for randomness.  Rather, most econometric students will have to work with 
observational (non-experimental) data.  Thus, they will need to learn skills for dealing with such 
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data, understanding what the potential sources of bias are, figuring out which quasi-experimental 
methods (if any) could address the potential biases, and making responsible conclusions.  These 
are the skills that will be needed for most people using regression analysis to try to solve 
problems. 
 
While I make the case for changes to undergraduate econometrics, I also raise the issue of 
whether graduate econometrics needs a change also.  This stems from the fact that most of the 
problems I discuss are based on Ph.D. researchers making errors in modeling and interpretations. 
 
The ideas and arguments I present come from my experiences in two types of worlds: in research 
organizations (where I had to develop models to assess policy options) and as an academic 
(creating my own research and teaching about econometrics). 
 
My approach in this paper is the following: 
• Section 2 gives the premises behind why I believe changes are needed and demonstrates 
how much various topics are covered and how little more-important topics are covered in 
the leading textbooks. 
• Section 3 presents some examples of topics with decades of research failing to recognize 
biases and examples of my own research errors. 
• Section 4 discusses my proposed changes. 




2. Why a revamping is needed 
 
In this section, I give 6 reasons why there needs to be a major shift in teaching econometrics, and 
I show what is emphasized in the current top undergraduate textbooks.  The reasons also serve as 
the premises for my support of some of Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) recommendations  and for 
my recommended changes (Section 4).  The 6 reasons are: 
• Most students will go into the non-academic world;  
• Economic research is rife with errors; 
• Biases in coefficient estimates threaten a model’s validity much more than biases in 
standard errors;  
• The conventional methods for teaching econometrics do not adequately prepare students 
to recognize biases to coefficient estimates;   
• The high-level math and proofs are unnecessary and take valuable time away from more 
important concepts; and 
• There are ethical problems in research, namely on the search for significance and not 
fully disclosing potential sources of bias. 
 
 
Most students go into the non-academic world 
 
I have never seen a formal description of what skills are generally needed from econometric 
students at different levels.  So, let me take a stab at this, starting with Ph.D.’s. 
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Ph.D. Non-academics: From an assigned topic, make the best of observational data by 
recognizing the potential biases, developing the optimal method, choosing the best set of control 
variables, recognizing what biases cannot be addressed, and making responsible interpretations 
and conclusions.  In addition, they sometimes need to help research sponsors understand the best 
research questions to ask, in light of the feasibility of empirically addressing the questions. 
 
Ph.D. Academics: On top of what Ph.D. Non-academics need to do, create research topics.  This 
is often done by finding sources of exogenous variation from random assignments or quasi-
experimental methods. 
 
Masters and undergraduate econometric students: The same as Ph.D. Non-academics, but with 
generally less responsibility. 
 
One colleague said to me as I was writing my textbook, “Undergraduate econometrics is taught 
as if everyone will go on to a Ph.D. Economics program.”  I would take that statement further 
and argue that undergraduate econometrics is generally taught as if everyone will go on to 
become an econometric theorist.  But, few will. 
 
There are about 26,500 undergraduate economics majors per year (Stock, 2017).  And, according 
to the American Economics Association, there are about 1000 new Economics Ph.D.’s each 
year.3  I will guess that no more than 50 or so econometric theorists earn a Ph.D. each year.  
There are also some Economics Ph.D. students who may not have had undergraduate 
econometrics.  And so, less than 4% of undergraduate econometric students end up receiving an 
Economics Ph.D., and roughly 0.2% of them end up becoming econometric theorists.   
 
These figures are important for a few recommended changes.  It supports Angrist and Pischke’s 
(2017) point that the high-level math (i.e., calculus and linear algebra) can be de-emphasized in 
undergraduate econometrics, as it mostly serves to understand the theory of econometrics.  At the 
same time, the low percentage of undergraduate students eventually earning a Ph.D. should 
challenge Angrist and Pischke’s argument on focusing on randomized control trials (RCTs) and 
certain quasi-experimental methods.  Certainly, the trend has shifted, as they argue, and we see 
these approaches used more frequently in journal articles and by many job market candidates 
these days.  But, the main problem with their argument is that opportunities to use RCT and 
some quasi-experimental methods (e.g., Regression Discontinuity) are more for academics who 
can choose their own research topic, often by finding randomization or a threshold discontinuity 
and building a research topic around that.  Most students in undergraduate and Masters-level 
econometrics courses will not become academics.  Most will enter the non-academic world in 
which they cannot choose their own topic, but rather are given an issue to examine.  It will be 
rare that they will have a randomization or a discontinuity.  And so, they need to be prepared to 
make the best of the observational data they are given. 
 
I grant that not all undergraduate econometric students will have a job using econometrics.  But, 
perhaps the greater skill they should come away with is the ability to recognize sources of bias.  
																																																								
3 This comes from https://www.aeaweb.org/resources/students/careers/the-economics-profession.  
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This could help them understand why correlation could but does not always mean causation.  It 
could help them understand other important statistical concepts such as omitted-variables bias 
and Type I errors, both of which have applications to many workplace situations.  Learning 
about biases could help engender a healthy skepticism in the statistics they hear every day.  And, 
these are skills that could form the foundation for more efficient learning in graduate 
econometrics, for those who take that route. 
 
 
Economic research is rife with errors  
 
When I worked for a well-known research organization, there was a project that aimed to 
redesign the educational system for a small country.  A senior researcher in the organization said 
that this is a scary task because the country was actually going to implement the 
recommendations, which stands in contrast with the research the organization has done for the 
Department of Defense and other parts of the government, in which it was rare that its 
recommendations (and analyses) were tested with implementation. 
 
At least the senior researcher understood that research can be wrong, which should be a more 
prevalent view.  There is growing evidence of major errors in research.  The Economist 
magazine, in 2013, had an article on the problems with research.4  The article notes that, in the 
field of medical research, Amgen was able to replicate just 6 of 53 important studies on cancer.  
Furthermore, the percentage of studies across many disciplines with “negative results” accounted 
for 30% of studies in 1990 and only 14% in 2007.   
 
While the article focused on medical and psychology research (since they have more types of 
studies in which replication attempts are feasible), economics research almost certainly has 
similar problems.  The article states, “Models which can be ‘tuned’ in many different ways give 
researchers more scope to perceive a pattern where none exists.”  The combination of the latitude 
researchers have for modeling, their pressure to publish, and the likelihood of Type I errors raise 
a serious concern about the legitimacy about much economic research.   
 
In Section 3, I give some examples in a few topics closer to economics of nearly the entire 
literature consisting of research errors.  The problems did not stem from sub-optimal methods, 
but rather the problems were based on authors not recognizing the potential biases.  And, I 
discuss some of my own mistakes and failures to recognize biases.  This highlights the point 
below that the current methods are not working well for preparing students to develop proper 
models and to recognize the biases.  
 
 
Biases in coefficient estimates threaten a model’s validity more than biases in standard errors 
 
As mentioned above, Angrist and Pischke (2017) argued that there should be less emphasis on 
getting the standard errors correct.  There is ample justification for their argument that they did 
not give.  First, in almost all cases, the bias in standard errors would be relatively small.  From 
																																																								
4 “Trouble at the Lab.”  The Economist 409 (8858), pp. 26-30. 
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my experience, almost all corrections for clustering or heteroskedasticity result in standard errors 
being adjusted less than 15%.  That said, there can be instances of much larger bias in the 
standard errors, particularly for panel data sets.  For example, Petersen (2009) finds that the bias 
in standard errors for finance panel data sets is as high as 45% under certain circumstances.  But, 
generally speaking, the bias on coefficient estimates from any of the major pitfalls (e.g., reverse 
causality, omitted-variables bias, and measurement error) could be significantly larger and, 
except for measurement error, even produce an estimated effect that has the reverse sign of the 
true effect.   
 
Supporting this idea is the contention that the major research errors are more likely to come from 
biased coefficient estimates than biased standard errors.  For example, the initial research on 
estrogen replacement therapy (based on observational data) suggested that it was highly 
beneficial to women (e.g., Ettinger et al., 1996).  However, a follow-on randomized control trial 
in 2002 found that taking estrogen could actually lead to a greater risk of death.5  And, later 
research after following the participants in the randomized study for longer found that taking 
estrogen could actually improve health outcomes (Manson et al., 2017), depending on age. 
 
Another argument supporting Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) idea of reducing the emphasis on 
biases to standard errors is the vagueness of the p-value.  Getting the standard errors correct is 
typically meant to make correct conclusions on hypothesis tests, which are usually based on t-
stats or p-values meeting certain thresholds.  But, as I learned not too long ago, the p-value 
actually has little meaning, given the Bayesian critique of p-values.   This is discussed by 
Iaonnidis (2005), who points out that the probability that an empirical relationship is real 
depends on: (1) the t-statistic; (2) the a priori probability that there could be an empirical 
relationship; and (3) the statistical power of the study (and this depends on the probability of a 
false negative and requires an alternative hypothesized value).  The p-value is based just on the 
first one, the t-statistic.  The less likely there is such a relationship, a priori, the less likely any 
given t-statistic indicates a significant relationship, as Nuzzo (2014) demonstrates. 
 
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to know beforehand what the probability is that there is an 
effect of one variable on another.  And so, higher levels of significance than is the current 
convention would be needed to make any strong conclusions about statistical relationships being 
real.  Given the vagueness of the p-value and that high levels of significance should be used to 
make any strong conclusions, errors in the standard errors would be much less impactful to those 
conclusions than would potentially-much-larger biases in coefficient estimates. 
 
Correcting standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering is still important, yet it is easy to 
recognize when it’s needed and typically takes only a few characters of code.  Recognizing and 
addressing biases to coefficient estimates is more difficult, and so greater emphasis should go 




5 Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators. (2002). Risks and benefits of estrogen 
plus progestin in healthy postmenopausal women: principal results from the Women's Health 
Initiative randomized controlled trial. JAMA, 288(3), 321-333. 
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Current methods do not teach how to recognize biases 
 
This statement is based on several observations.  First, as mentioned earlier, there are many 
errors in academic research.  Second, my observation has been that graduate students, after they 
have taken a few econometric courses with the conventional approach (using one of the 
textbooks in Table 1 below), have no idea how to recognize basic pitfalls in research articles and 
reports. Third, after having received the conventional training in econometrics, I have failed in 
several instances to recognize pitfalls and biases in my own research.  (I will describe some of 
those below.)  Fourth, just by common sense, it must be difficult to translate the common 
concept of conditional mean dependence/independence of the error to recognize whether the 
model might be biased.  I admittedly have difficulty and have to think hard about making this 
connection.  Fifth, conditional mean dependence of the error term cannot explain the biases from 
measurement error and the inclusion of mediating factors in a model. 
 
Consistent with Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) argument, the pedagogy on teaching students how 
to recognize biases, perhaps, should rely more on examples of cases in which a bias could affect 
the coefficient estimates than on equations.  However, in contrast to their approach, the elusive 




There is too much unnecessary math and proofs  
 
I consider myself to be a “generalist” researcher, with forays into military, labor, health, 
behavioral, and sports economics.  In my dozens of publications and dozens of reports, I never 
needed the calculus or linear algebra that was used in the econometrics courses I took.  The math 
never helped me understand what happens when you hold other factors constant.  And, it never 
helped me understand how to recognize the pitfalls and sources of bias.  What contributed to my 
understanding of these things has been the intuition I have learned from using regressions for any 
research projects and from the mistakes I made—mistakes due to never adequately grasping how 
to recognize the pitfalls of regression analysis. 
 
And so, along the lines of Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) argument, real examples would be much 
more useful and practical than the math underlying the regressions.  The lessons from examples 
are almost certainly more likely to be retained than abstract equations.  Adding visual aids could 
be even more effective.   
 
 
There is an ethical problem in economic research 
 
In the scores of job-market-candidate seminars I have attended in my two decades since graduate 
school, I do not remember one in which the candidate had an insignificant estimated effect of the 
key explanatory variable.  The high percentage of significant results could be due to graduate 
students giving up on a topic if the results do not support the theory they developed.  But, it 
could also partly stem from the search for significance, meaning that the students keep changing 
the model (by adding or cutting control variables or by changing the method) until they achieve a 
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desirable result, as suggested in the Economist article mentioned earlier.  This is known as p-
hacking. 
 
Another issue is that researchers are not always fully honest and forthright about potential 
limitations of a study.  To do so would reduce their chance of being published.  Or, for those 
producing reports for sponsors (e.g., at research organizations), I suspect that many do not want 
to express any lack of confidence in their results. 
 
These ethical problems are certainly not universal, as most research is probably done objectively 
and honestly.  But, there is certainly a portion of research that could be conducted more 
responsibly.  Simple ethical lessons might be able to help. 
 
 
Table 1.  What the main textbooks teach 
















Things that could bias the standard errors  
  Heteroskedasticity 5 28 1 47 12 5 
  Multicollinearity 3 5 28 31 3 10 
       
Things that could bias the coefficient estimates 
  Simultaneity 4 20 27 32 24 18 
  Omitted-variables bias 9 5 8 6 0 2 
  Measurement error 3 7 4 5 0.25 7 
  Mediating factors 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Other important topics  
  Holding other factors 
constant 
1 9 5 5 2 2 
  Bayesian critique of  
p-values 
0 0 0 0 0 19 
  Interpreting an 
insignificant 
coefficient estimate 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Fixed effects 12 8 0 15 3 6 
 
 
What the textbooks teach 
 
Table 1 shows my estimates on the number of pages devoted to various topics in the six 
textbooks I believe are the most widely used for undergraduate econometrics.6  This is not a 
scientific assessment, as it is based on my judgment of the number of pages having the 
																																																								
6	I do not include Angrist and Pischke (2014) here because it is not a full textbook starting with the 
basics.	
	 10	
discussion centered around the topic and does not include other mentions of the topic.  One 
striking pattern is that, other than for “simultanteity,” there appears to be much greater emphasis 
on the things that could bias the standard errors than there is on the things that could bias the 
coefficient estimates.  In fact, one of the potential sources of bias for coefficient estimates is not 
even mentioned: inclusion of mediating factors.  Furthermore, in most of these books, there is 
very little discussion on what “holding other factors constant” means, and there is no discussion 
in any of the books on the Bayesian critique of p-values (other than Kennedy (2008)) or how to 
interpret an insignificant coefficient estimate.  Assuming that econometrics courses mirror these 
books, there are many changes needed in the teaching of econometrics, as the typical emphasis in 




3. Evidence that the “con” remains in economic studies 
 
Responding to Leamer’s (1983) critique on the unreliability of econometric research, Angrist and 
Pischke (2010) argued that better data and better research designs have improved the credibility 
of econometric research.  I imagine that, overall, there have been improvements in research.  
However, plenty of unreliable research continues to be published.  
 
I will discuss in this section the following three research topics in which the investigators failed 
to recognize likely biases and did not realize it for decades: 
(A) The hot hand in basketball, continuing the discussion from the Introduction; 
(B) The public-finance/macroeconomic topic of how state tax rates affect Gross State 
Product; 
(C) How occupation-specific bonuses affect the probability of reenlistment in the military. 
 
 
The hot hand in basketball 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, no researcher in the first 25 years of study on the hot hand in 
basketball found any evidence for the hot hand.  The researchers (and Nobel Prize winners 
writing about this research) claimed that the “hot hand is a myth” or a “figment of our 
imagination.” 
 
The first major error the researchers and others made is that they interpreted an insignificant 
estimate as proof of non-existence.  The correct interpretation should have been that there is no 
evidence for the hot hand.  This is a common logical error made throughout academia (not just 
Economics and Statistics), and it was highlighted in Amrhein, Greenland, and McShane (2019), 
which I discuss below. 
 
The second major error is that the researchers (including myself this time) failed to recognize 
what should have been an obvious bias: measurement error.  Stone (2012) noted that the hot 
hand means that a player is in a state in which he/she has a higher probability than normal of 
making a shot (which contrasts with the conventional thought that a player “can’t miss”).  This 
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means that a player can be in the hot-hand state and miss a shot, and the player can be in the 
normal state and make a few shots in a row, making it seem like he/she is in that hot-hand state. 
 
So, the crude indicator I used for being in the hot hand state in Arkes (2010)—making the first of 
two free throws—and the indicator that others have used (e.g., making the last three shots) could 
very well occur in the normal state.  And, having missed the prior shot(s) could still occur in the 
“hot hand” state.  The mis-classification likely caused a downward bias. And, this certainly could 
contribute to the failure of most studies to detect the hot hand.  And, for the hot-hand effect I 
found for free throws, the measurement error likely led to an understatement of that hot-hand 
effect. 
 
Miller and Sanjurjo (2018) found another error in this research that was not so obvious.  They 
demonstrated that, if you take all “heads” in a finite sequence of coin flips, the probability that 
the following flip is “heads” is actually less than 50%.  They then applied this to the hot-hand 
application and, with the correction, actually found a significant hot-hand effect with the data 
used in the seminal hot-hand study (Gilovich et al., 1985).  This source of bias again highlights 




How state income tax rates affect Gross State Product 
 
Another research topic that has had a series of questionable modeling strategies has been on how 
state tax rates affect state economic growth.  The convention has been to use a Cobb-Douglas 
model as the theoretical framework underpinning the econometric model.  The Cobb-Douglas 
model has state economic growth as a function of tax rates, as well as other economic factors 
such as labor and capital.  And so, models typically include control variables reflecting labor and 
capital.  For example, several studies include a measure of the unemployment rate as a control 
variable (Mofidi and Stone, 1990; Bania et al., 2007).  Others use the amount of capital (Reed, 
2008; Yeoh and Stansel, 2011).  And, some studies even include state personal income per capita 
(Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985; Poulson and Kaplan, 2008) or the wage rate (e.g., Wasylenko 
and McGuire, 1985; Funderberg et al., 2013) as control variables. 
 
Including these variables may not have been the best approach.  Bartik (1991) raised an 
important consideration for these models that has been largely ignored in the literature: that 
several factors of economic growth are endogenous. Variables such as the average wage rate, the 
labor supply (proxied by the unemployment rate), the level of capital, and capital growth are all 
factors of economic growth and, at the same time, are measures of economic growth that could 
depend on the tax rate.  They are what Angrist and Pischke (2009) described as “bad controls” in 
that they come after the treatment (taxes) and control for part of the effect of the tax rate.  Or, we 
can consider these variables as potential mediating factors for how the tax rate affects economic 
growth.  That is, tax rates could affect how much investment there is and how much employment 
growth there is, which in turn affect economic growth.  We can also think of investment, the 
unemployment rate, and personal-income-per-capita being outcomes themselves.   
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Including these variables means that what is being estimated is the effect of tax rates on Gross 
State Product beyond the effects on employment growth, investment, and personal-income-per-
capita.  This is no longer informative on how tax rates affect Gross State Product.  The counter-
argument is that excluding these factors from the model could cause omitted-variables bias.  At 
the very least, the issue of mediating factors versus omitted-variables bias should be 
acknowledged by the researchers. 
 
 
How occupation-specific bonuses affect the probability of reenlistment 
 
This is an important research issue for the military services, as they try to set the optimal bonuses 
to achieve a required reenlistment rate in an occupation.  And yet, no researcher has gotten this 
correct (unless they were lucky) in over 40 years, nor have they fully recognized the biases. 
 
Arkes (2018) describes four major sources of bias in these studies: 
1. There is the obvious bias of reverse causality, that lower reenlistment rates lead to higher 
bonuses. 
2. Enlisted personnel often have latitude on when they reenlist, so if they are planning to 
reenlist, they may time it when the bonus appears to be higher than normal; so, the bonus 
is endogenous in that it is chosen to some extent by those reenlisting. 
3. There is likely bias from measurement error, as service-persons often have a few different 
bonuses during their reenlistment window, and the one most often recorded is the one at 
the official reenlistment date, not the one when they sign the new contract (which is not 
among the available data and can be up to two months earlier). 
4. There is unobserved heterogeneity because excess supply for reenlistments can mean that 
we only observe whether a person reenlists rather than whether he/she is willing to 
reenlist (or, actual reenlistment supply).  Excess supply of reenlistments could result from 
reduced demand from the military (e.g., occupations being eliminated) or worsening 
civilian prospects for the skill. 
 
In the numerous studies on this topic—see Arkes (2018) for a list of some of the more recent 
studies—none recognized the third and fourth sources of bias, and only one (Goldberg, 2001) 
recognized the second source of bias.  Furthermore, most studies attempted to address the reverse 
causality with occupation and year fixed effects.  But, any variation across occupations in 
changes in the propensity to reenlist (due to changing civilian-economy opportunities or military 
environment) would still result in this reverse causality.  I proposed using occupation-fiscal-year-
interacted fixed effects to reduce the bias from reverse causality, but I acknowledged that it 
likely leads to greater bias from measurement error (Arkes, 2018). 
 
The end result of this is that, with the historical and current reenlistment rules and inadequate 
data, this is a research question that just cannot be accurately answered.  While Hansen and 
Wenger (2005) note that different assumptions in such models produce widely different results, 
no study until Arkes (2018) had actually noted that we just cannot answer this question with any 




Examples of my own errors 
 
I have been guilty of research mistakes as well, beyond my failure to recognize the 
measurement-error bias in my hot-hand study.  In several studies examining how the state 
unemployment rate affects various outcomes, I failed there as well to recognize a likely source of 
measurement error that likely caused a bias towards zero (e.g., Arkes, 2007; Arkes and Mehay, 
2013; Arkes and Shen, 2014).  The monthly unemployment rate is measured with a relatively 
large amount error at the state level, and using state fixed effects means that a higher share of 
usable variation in the unemployment rate stems from measurement error.  The estimated effects 
were likely understated due to this measurement error.  In one of my first studies coming out of 
graduate school, I was in the mode of throwing the kitchen sink into the regression, unaware that 
mediating factors should not be included.  And so, in a project for the U.S. Navy that examined 
how working in a skill-related job on a Sailor’s shore assignment (after a 3-5-year sea 
assignment) affected their probability of reenlistment, I included likely mediating factors as 
control variables (Arkes and Golding, 1998).  I only realized how doing so creates a bias when I 
started understanding better what “holding other factors constant” really means.   
 
 
4.  Recommended changes and new topics 
 
Two of Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) recommendations are well justified, as they follow from 
the premises I discussed in Section 2.  They are: 
• Replace the math with intuition and examples 
• Reduce the emphasis on getting the standard errors correct.  
 
The first is consistent with basic tenets of pedagogy, as the practice of some skill to learn about 
certain concepts can be much more instructive than learning the abstract equations underlying 
the concepts.  The second is not meant to say that heteroskedasticity and clustering should not be 
taught.  Rather, these are basic concepts that are quite simple to recognize and to correct for; in 
contrast, biases to coefficient estimates are not as easy to recognize and correct for. 
 
The premises from Section 2 also lead to other changes that go beyond, or stand in contrast to 
Angrist and Pischke’s (2017) recommended changes.  These are the changes and shifts in 
emphasis that should help to develop effective and responsible practitioners (beyond just 
academics).  The recommended changes and shifts I will discuss are: 
 
A. Adopt new approaches for teaching how to recognize biases  
B. Focus on some quasi-experimental methods 
C. Add emphasis on interpretations on statistical significance 
D. Add a simple ethical component 
E. Increase emphasis on other regression basics (“holding other factors constant” and 
regression objectives) 





A.  Adopt new approaches to teach how to recognize biases 
 
As I have described, I do not believe that “conditional mean dependence of the error term” is an 
effective concept to teach how to recognize biases.  I believe that listing the most common 
sources of bias, providing some visual depictions of the bias, and giving examples of the various 
types of situations in which they might arise could be more effective.  In Arkes (2019), I list 
what I believe are the 6 most common biases for coefficient estimates.  These are the main 
alternative stories that need to be considered before making conclusions from results.  In 
addition, I use flowcharts of effects to demonstrate reverse causality and omitted-variables bias.  
Likewise, in his textbook, Cunningham (2018) uses a “directed acyclical graphical” (DAG) 
approach to represent causality. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the concept of reverse causality with an analysis of how occupation-
specific bonuses (in the military) affect the probability of reenlistment.  An arrow in such a 
pictorial representation of a model would represent the causal effect of a one-unit change in the 
pointing variable on the pointed-to variable.  The objective would be to estimate A, the causal 
effect of the occupational-specific bonus on the probability that a service-person reenlists.  The 
question to ask for reverse causality is whether the probability of reenlistment could affect the 
bonus, represented by B in Figure 1.  And, it very likely could, as a decrease in the probability of 
reenlistment for people in a certain occupation (due perhaps to increases in civilian labor market 
demand for the skill or increases in the deployment rates for the occupation) would cause the 
military service to have to increase the bonus; and an increase in the probability of reenlistment 
would allow the service to reduce the bonus.   
 
Because B is likely negative, there would be a negative bias from the reverse causality on the 
estimated effect of the bonus on the probability of reenlistment.  (It requires much deeper and 
more-convoluted thought to determine the sign of the bias from the conditional-mean-
dependence-of-the-error-term argument.)  Thus, we would have an alternative story for why the 
estimated effect of the bonus is what it is—i.e., alternative to the causal-effects story.  Attempts 
to address this with fixed effects would need to make sure that, within the fixed-effects group, 
there still would not be any potential reverse causality (or omitted-variables bias). 
 
Figure 1.   A visual representation of reverse causality. 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate two types of omitted-variables bias.  In Figure 2, borrowed from 
Arkes (2019), we are examining how oatmeal consumption affects bad cholesterol (LDL).  So, A 
is the true average effect of a one-unit increase in oatmeal consumption (however it is measured) 





Figure 2.  A visual representation of omitted-variables bias 
 
 
The omitted-variables bias is that there is a non-quantifiable or unavailable variable (“concern 
for healthy living”) that probably has a positive effect on oatmeal consumption (B) and a 
negative effect on bad cholesterol (C).  The product of B and C is negative, so not controlling for 
this factor would lead to a negative omitted-variables bias.  If a negative coefficient estimate on 
oatmeal resulted from such a model, it would be uncertain whether this was due to an actual 
beneficial effect of oatmeal on bad cholesterol or the alternative story of a negative omitted-
variables bias. 
 
Figure 3 presents a different sort of omitted-variables bias, with the research question being how 
does the state unemployment rate affect teenage marijuana use.  Whereas the example in Figure 
2 was likely a systematic bias (by the nature of things), the omitted-variables bias in Figure 3 
could be from incidental correlation.  The problem is that it just might be that states that have a 
higher general propensity to use marijuana (outside the influence of the economy or 
unemployment rate) could tend to have higher or lower unemployment rates.  And so, this 
incidental correlation could cause omitted-variables bias.  (The line without arrows is indicative 
of an incidental correlation that does not have an underlying systematic relationship.) 
 
Figure 3.  A visual representation of omitted-variables bias from incidental correlation 
 
 
In this case, controlling for the states (with dummy variables or state fixed effects) would help 
towards addressing this problem.  However, it could cause other problems, such as greater bias 












As a tangent, Arkes (2019) notes that the conventional definition of omitted-variables bias needs 
some modification.  Note that in Figures 2 and 3, the correlation between the treatment and the 
omitted variable is based on the omitted variable affecting the treatment or incidental correlation.  
If, on the other hand, the omitted variable were a mediating factor and was affected by the 
treatment, then there is no omitted-variables bias by excluding the variable; rather, there would 
be bias by including the variable.  And so the conventional definition that an omitted variable is 
correlated with the treatment and affects the outcome needs to add as a condition that the 
correlation is not solely due to the treatment affecting the omitted variable. 
 
In another visual lesson to recognize the direction of the biases, the bias from (non-differential) 
measurement error can be demonstrated with a simple bar graph of an outcome (say, income) for 
two groups (no-college-degree and college-degree).  One can then easily see what would happen 
to the difference in income if people get randomly misclassified as to whether they have a 
college degree. 
 
For mediating factors, the question is whether there is any control variable that is a product of the 
treatment variable.  If so, the researcher should take it out (if the objective were estimating causal 
effects).  Overall, these examples show some of the questions to be asked.  
 
Visual representations, along with empirical examples for students, should help students (and 
researchers/practioners) improve their ability to recognize biases and to understand the 
limitations of econometrics.  There are times when econometrics just cannot answer the 
questions we pose.  In such situations, the limitations need to be identified, and it may require a 
punt.   
 
 
B. Focus on some quasi-experimental methods 
 
Angrist and Pischke (2017) espouse a shift in econometrics classes focus to randomized-control 
trials and quasi-experimental methods.  One method they mention is the Regression-
Discontinuity (RD) approach.  The latter has appeared to be the new favorite approach for 
graduate students.  This strategy parallels their book (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and an earlier 
article (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).  But, these methods are more for academics and graduate 
students who can search for randomness or a discontinuity and build a topic from that.  It is not 
as effective for non-academics who will probably never have the opportunity to apply a RCT or 
RD to the problems they are given in the workplace.  Furthermore, it limits the usefulness of 
economists.  As Sims (2010) stated: 
“If applied economists narrow the focus of their research and critical reading to various 
forms of pseudo-experimental, the profession loses a good part of its ability to provide 
advice about the effects and uncertainties surrounding policy issues.”  
 
Sims (2010) also suggested that many of the quasi-experimental studies have limited scope with 
regards to the extrapolation of the results.  This could occur, for example, due to non-linearities 
or just limited range of effects that would not be captured by the Local Average Treatment Effect 




Meanwhile, the less-complicated and less-sexy quasi-experimental methods might be more 
fruitful for people in the non-academic world and may be less limiting in extrapolation of the 
estimates.  In particular, fixed-effects methods are often the only plausible approach to 
addressing some problems.  
 
Given that the fixed-effects method would likely be a more useful tool than RD and other quasi-
experimental methods, more emphasis should be placed on the nuances of fixed effects.  These 
include many particulars of fixed effects that I wish I had learned in college or graduate school.  
For example: 
(1) As described above in some things I had missed in my own research, bias from 
measurement error can be exacerbated by fixed effects; 
(2) The estimated treatment effect with fixed effects is a weighted average of the estimated 
treatment effects within each fixed-effects group; 
(3) The natural regression weights of the fixed-effects groups with a higher variance of the 
treatment become disproportionately higher—this concept and the correction is described 
in Gibbons et al. (2018) and Arkes (2019); also besides fixed effects, this concept applies 
to controlling for categories (e.g., race). 
 
 
C. Add emphasis on interpretations on statistical significance 
 
Perhaps the most important topic for which interpretations need to be taught better is on 
statistical significance and insignificance.  In a recent article in Nature, Amrhein, Greenland, and 
McShane (2019) call for an end to statistical significance and p-values and instead to use 
confidence intervals.  They cite the problems with p-values, similar to the Bayesian critique that 
I describe above—that a p-value and statistical significance at given significance levels provide 
uncertain information.  And, they find that over half of 791 articles across five journals made the 
mistake of interpreting insignificance as meaning that there is no effect—and these do not 
include the hot-hand studies and the errors the Nobel Prize winners made.  Aczel et al. (2018) 
find an even worse statistic for three leading psychology journals: 72% of 137 studies from 2015 
with negative results had incorrect interpretations of those results.   
 
Assuming the concept of statistical significance will continue to be used, econometrics needs to 
be taught with clarity on what an insignificant coefficient estimate means.  As described above, 
an insignificant estimate does not prove that there is no effect.  In fact, an insignificant estimate, 
if large enough, may still provide more evidence for the alternative hypothesis than for the null, 
although such calculations are quite complex (Aczel et al., 2018).  And, there is always the 
possibility that a bias has caused the insignificance—and, a bias could cause significance when 
there is no causal effect.  Furthermore, as described in Arkes (2019), if it is possible that the 
treatment positively affects some and negatively affects others, it could be that an insignificant 
effect is the sum of these positive and negative effects that are, to some extent, cancelling each 




In addition, the Bayesian critique of p-values should be part of any discussion on interpreting 
hypothesis tests (at least indirectly).  Unfortunately, this introduces an inconvenient vagueness in 
properly interpreting a hypothesis test.  But, it is the proper approach to interpreting statistical 
tests.  And, it should give the important lesson that strong conclusions on an empirical 
relationship should require quite high levels of significance.  
 
 
D. Add a simple ethical component 
 
We conduct research to help inform society on the best public policies, health behaviors, 
business practices, and more. What we hope to see in others’ research is the product of the 
optimal model they can develop, not the product of their efforts to find statistical significance.  
This means that our goal in research should not be to find statistical significance, but rather to 
develop the best model to answer a research question and to give a responsible assessment of that 
model. 
 
I recommend a few basic lessons in ethics.  The first one would stress honesty in research and 
would give examples of when people might not be honest, such as with p-hacking. The second 
lesson would be the simple concept that “significance not the goal of research.”  This is obvious 
to my students when they hear it, but it is new to them.  And, it proves to be a valuable lesson.  
One student said, in an end-of-term reflection paper, that she had an insignificant estimate on her 
treatment variable in her thesis.  She had the temptation to change the model to find significance, 
but she resisted that temptation based on this simple lesson that significance is not the goal.  The 
third lesson in ethics would be on the importance of making responsible conclusions.  This 
should involve being completely forthright about all potential pitfalls and biases that could not be 
addressed and being careful with the conclusions on significance based on the Bayesian critique 
of p-values.  This is important for society to properly synthesize the meaning and conclusions 
that can be drawn from a study.  
 
These lessons may also benefit from what Baicker et al. (2013) did for the study on how an 
expansion of Medicaid in Oregon affected health outcomes.  They developed their model and 
published the research plan before implementing it.  Not everyone can publish their research 
plan, but it could be posted online with a date stamp.  
 
 
E.  Increase emphasis on other regression basics (“holding other factors constant” and regression 
objectives) 
 
I believe it is commonly assumed that students will understand “holding other factors constant” 
from the few pages, if that, devoted to the concept in the textbook.  But, this is usually not the 
case. 
 
Understanding “holding other factors constant” is important for determining the optimal set of 
control variables to use.  And, this is important to understand the strategies for the different 
objectives of regression analysis.   
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Lessons on this topic should include a discussion of the purpose of holding other factors 
constant, a demonstration of what happens when you do so, and in what circumstances would 
you not want to hold certain factors constant.  In Arkes (2019), I describe a simple issue of 
whether adding cinnamon to your chocolate-chip cookie improves the taste.  And, I ask which is 
the better approach: (1) make two batches from scratch, adding cinnamon to one; or (2) make 
one batch, split it in two, and add cinnamon to one of them.  Most would agree that the second 
would be a better test because you do not want any other factor (butter, sugar, and chocolate 
chips) to vary as you switch from no-cinnamon to cinnamon.  That is, you want to hold those 
other factors constant.  The same idea applies to regression analysis.   
 
In Arkes (2019), I describe what I believe are the four main objectives of regression analyses: (1) 
estimating causal effects; (2) forecasting/predicting an outcome; (3) determining predictors for 
an outcome; and (4) analyzing relative performance by removing the influence of contextual 
factors.  I proceed to describe how the choice of control variables (what should be held constant) 
should depend on the objective.  For example, a causal-effects model might attempt to estimate 
the effect of a college degree on the probability of getting in a car accident in a given year.  An 
insurance company, on the other hand, might be more interested in predicting the probability of a 
person getting in a car accident.  One potential control variable would be whether the person has 
a white-collar job.  That could be a mediating factor for how a college degree affects the 
probability of an accident, so it would be best to exclude that variable in the causal-effects 
analysis.  However, the insurance company might find that variable to be a valuable contributor 
to obtain a more accurate prediction of the probability of an accident.  The insurance company 
does not care about obtaining the correct estimate of how a college degree affects the likelihood 
of an accident.  Likewise, forecasting GDP (or GSP) growth would involve a different strategy 
than estimating the effects of tax rates on GDP growth.  Perhaps this message is coming to the 
forefront with machine-learning techniques. 
 
 
F. Advocate less complexity 
 
The current go-to model for the Department of Defense (DoD) for evaluating the effects of 
various manpower policies (including bonuses) on retention is the Dynamic Retention Model 
(DRM).  This is a complex model that only recently has become estimable, given the huge 
computing power it requires.  Even though I had a (very) small role in an application of it, I do 
not understand the model.  And I’m guessing that no one at DoD understands the model neither.  
This gave me a great epiphany a few years ago: The DoD often puts more faith in the more-
complex things they understand the least. 
 
But, the DRM is deficient in many ways, as described in Arkes et al. (2019).  In retention 
models, the DRM estimates complex concepts, such as the discount rate and a taste-for-military 
parameter.  But, it fails to control for basic factors that could partly address the reverse causality 
for bonuses I describe above, such as military occupation, fiscal year, and their interactions 
(Arkes, 2018).  Furthermore, the DRM will never be able to address the other problems noted 
above of measurement error and excess supply, as we only observe whether a person reenlists, 
not their willingness to reenlist.  Thus, the DRM will probably not give a more-reliable answer 
than the simpler and more-direct models. 
	 20	
 
These empirical challenges are probably not well known to DoD officials.  And so, they appear 
to be enamored by the complexity of the model.  Academics may be similar in such thinking.  
Some may put more faith in complex models.  But, the simpler models are often more credible, 
as they rely on fewer assumptions.   
 
One lesson may come from the history of instrumental-variables models.  Early studies tended to 
not pay much attention to the validity of the instruments.  For example, Sims (2010) noted that 
Ehrlich’s (1975) research on capital punishment lacked any discussion on the validity of the 
numerous instruments that were used, such as lagged endogenous variables.   Later studies (e.g., 





5. Conclusions and topics for further discussion 
 
The teaching of undergraduate econometrics needs to be revamped.  And, as instructors, we need 
to recognize that not everyone is going to be an academic with the freedom to search the world 
for random assignment and choose their own topics from the randomness they find.  Rather, 
most students will become non-academic practitioners or consumers.  As practitioners, they 
would have to deal with an issue assigned to them in which there is probably no random 
assignment.  Their task would be to recognize the potential sources of bias, design the optimal 
method to address the issue, choose the optimal set of control variables, recognize the remaining 
sources of bias that could not be addressed, and make responsible conclusions.  Or, as consumers 
of research, they should have the tools to recognize biases, which can also apply to the everyday 
statistics they hear in the news or even properly assessing events by considering alternative 
stories that can explain outcomes.  These are the things that undergraduate econometrics courses 
should be aimed towards.  
 
While I discuss as rationale for making these changes that they will be more practical for those 
who go into the non-academic world and have to solve real-world problems (rather than choose 
their topic), the shift in emphasis could also benefit those going to graduate school and ultimately 
entering the academic world.  They would have a deeper understanding of the important practical 
issues in econometrics. 
 
Let me end by calling for a larger assessment of what skills Ph.D. economists need in their 
research.  Would most Ph.D. students benefit from a shift in focus from the high-level math to 
something more practical?  Should basic graduate econometrics be any different from 
undergraduate econometrics?  For what I believe is a large share of Ph.D. economists, two good 
low-math undergraduate courses (that incorporate the changes I describe above), along with 
applied graduate courses and plenty of practice, should be sufficient to prepare them to become 
successful researchers.  Based on my experiences at research organizations and in academia, I 
believe that these lessons would have been sufficient for most of my colleagues.  And, the shift 
that I have discussed, as I have demonstrated in this article, would have helped me avoid some 
research mistakes.  That said, anyone interested in becoming an econometric theorist would need 
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a course with the high-level math that is typically used in graduate econometric courses.  But, 
understanding the intuition underlying these models and the nuances should help students better 
understand the mathematical theory behind the models.  So, the question for us to consider is 
whether a more basic graduate econometrics course that shifted the emphasis from the 
underlying math to the intuition, recognizing the pitfalls, proper interpretations, and honesty in 
research would produce more effective researchers. 
 
At the very least, the teaching of econometrics for undergraduate (and probably Masters-level 
students) should be changed to give more practical skills in place of preparation for the few who 
proceed to an Economics Ph.D. program.  Then, maybe, those with these skills would catch us 
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